>>>>Two weeks ago fi360 hosted a webinar, “A fiduciary approach to conflicts of interest and risk governance.” During the session our two speakers, Mr. Blaine Aikin and Mr. Byron Bowman, spoke about conflicts of interest, risk governance, fulfilling fiduciary duties. In particular, Mr. Bowman spoke on the current focus the SEC is placing on conflicts. A recording of the webinar and the slides are now available for download on our website.
Mr. Aikin and Mr. Bowman were able to answer quite a few questions from attendees, though there were some questions that weren’t able to be addressed in the time available. Mr. Bowman has answered the remaining questions below, which we present in the following Q&A:
Q: In the case of dually-registered advisors, is disclosure of conflicts of interest a fiduciary requirement? Or is it enough to simply switch between the “two hats”?
Byron: It is not uncommon for RIAs to also be registered representatives of broker-dealers, often in order to be able to offer variable annuities or other insurance-related products to their clients. There is often confusion in the minds of both the advisor and the client as to the responsibility of the advisor to deal with conflicts of interest when dually-registered. While a registered representative is bound by its broker-dealer’s suitability requirements, an RIA may be subject to a fiduciary duty under state law if the RIA has investment discretion over the entire account. In that situation, the RIA should make full disclosure and obtain the client’s consent before placing a product in the account through the RIA’s broker-dealer. Many RIAs would seek to control this conflict by waiving their fee in an amount sufficient to offset any commission that the RIA would earn from the transaction.
Q: Do structured investment products always run the risk of conflicts of interest? I haven't yet seen one where the conflict of interest does not seem to be built into the product.
Byron: “Always” is a loaded word. Certainly, many—if not most—structured products have some conflicts of interest inherent in their structure. For this reason, it is crucial for an advisor considering such a product for a client to closely read the offering circular and be able to explain any conflicts of interest to the client.
Q: How is the trading desk as a profit center reconciled with the fiduciary duty to manage cost on behalf of the client?
Byron: An advisor is under a duty to obtain “best execution” for its clients; however, best execution may consist of a broad number of practices, including not only cost, but research and trade management. Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, permits fiduciaries to take into consideration these factors when placing trades with brokers. As a practical matter, an advisor should not refrain from using an affiliated trading desk solely because the desk operates as a profit center. However, the advisor should, as a matter of practice, (1) be able to evidence that the affiliated trading desk provides execution on a basis at least as beneficial to the customer as other competing brokers—considering all of the factors, (2) disclose the potential conflict to the client prior to using the affiliated trading desk, and (3) obtain the client’s consent before placing trades with the affiliated desk. An advisor choosing to use an affiliated trading desk should expect to be asked to provide regulatory examiners with evidence that the affiliated trading desk provides competitive execution; furthermore, the advisor should not be surprised if institutional or other sophisticated investors also request to review such information before consenting to the use of the affiliated desk.